

Message Text

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43

ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03

INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03

SS-15 USIA-15 ACDA-19 IO-13 SAJ-01 DRC-01 /145 W

----- 085074

R 131627Z SEP 73

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3148

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

CONGEN HONGKONG 967

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USMISSION NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 24147

DEPT PASS USLO PEKING FOR INFO

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, FR, CH, UR

SUBJECT: QUAI VIEWS OF PRC TENTH PARTY CONGRESS

SUMMARY: QUAI DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR ASIA DUZER THOUGHT CCP TENTH PARTY CONGRESS RESULTED IN FURTHER CONSOLIDATION OF CHO EN-LAI'S CONTROL IN CHINA. IN ADDITION TO REDUCING FURTHER THE ROLE OF "LEFTIST" ELEMENTS, THE CONGRESS ALSO RESULTED IN A REDUCTION OF CHAIRMAN MAO'S DIRECT POWER. DUZER THOUGHT THE CONSIDERABLE ESCALATION IN ANTI-SOVIET RHETORIC WAS PERHAPS MORE DESIGNED TO COVER CHOU'S OVERTURES TO THE US AND JAPAN THEN TO ALERT CHINESE PEOPLE TO SOVIET THREAT. END SUMMARY.

1. IN THE MIDST OF PREPARATIONS FOR HIS DEPARTURE FOR PEKING WITH PRESIDENT POMPIDOU'S PARTY, QUAI DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR ASIA, DUZER, DISCUSSED WITH EMBOFF SEPT. 10 THE FRENCH VIEWS FOR THE RECENT CCP
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TENTH PARTY CONGRESS. CHARACTERIZING CONGRESS AS ANOTHER COUP BY CHOU. DUZER SAID THE FIRST COUP

WAS THE SECOND PLENUM OF 1970, AND THE SECOND WAS IN 1971 WHEN HE ELIMINATED LIN PIAO AND CHEN PO-TA. WITH THIS THIRD COUP, CHO FURTHER CONSOLIDATED HIS OWN POWER. DUZER SAW ALL OF THE EVENTS SINCE 1970 AS ALSO CONTRIBUTING TO A REDUCTION IN MAO'S POWER, THROUGH THE ELIMINATION OF CHEN AND LIN AND NOW THE NAMING OF FIVE DEPUTY CHAIRMEN OF THE PARTY WHO WOULD BE INDIVIDUALLY MORE RESPONSIVE TO CHOU THAN MAO. IT WAS PERHAPS SYMBOLIC THAT MAO DID NOT EVEN SPEAK AT THE TENTH CONGRESS, WHEREAS HE DELIVERED THE REPORT AT THE NINTH. DUZER THOUGHT THAT THERE CONTINUED TO BE RESISTANCE TO CHOU'S LEADERSHIP IN THE PARTY, BUT IT WAS HARD TO DETERMINE WHAT WAS THE EXTENT OF OPPOSITION AND THE DEGREE TO WHICH CHOU HAD TO TAKE IT INTO CONSIDERATION IN MAKING POLICY.

2. DUZER THOUGHT THAT THE DOWNGRADING OF CHIANG CH'ING AND YAO WEN-YUAN WAS THE MOST STRIKING ASPECT OF THE PERSONNEL CHANGES. THE LINE-UP, COMPOSED OF OLD FIGURES AND A FEW NEW FACES, WAS NOT IN GENERAL EXCEPTIONAL, BUT THE CHINESE WOULD OBVIOUSLY SEE A GREAT LOSS OF FACE FOR CHIANG AND YAO IN THEIR SLIPPAGE IN THE HIERARCHY. DUZER WAS A LITTLE SUPRISED TO FIND THAT LI HSIEN-NIEN, CHOU'S FAITHFUL FOLLOWER, DID NOT RISE IN THE HIERARCHY TO MAKE THE STANDING COMMITTEE. THE ADDITION OF CHOU'S FOLLOWERS SUCH AS CH'I P'ENG-FEI, CH'IAO KUAN-HUA AND HUANG HUA TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PERHAPS COMPENSATES FOR THE LACK OF RESTORATION OF IMPORTANT PARTY POSITIONS TO TENG HSIAO-PING, TAN CHEN-LIN ETC.

3. DUZER THOUGHT THAT THE REPORT TO THE TENTH CONGRESS GAVE SOME INDICATION OF THE LINE THE FRENCH COULD EXPECT IN DISCUSSING EUROPE WITH CHOU. DUZER ANTICIPATED A REPEAT OF THE BASIC THEME THAT THERE IS BOTH RIVALRY AND COLLUSION BETWEEN THE GREAT POWERS (THE US AND USSR), BUT THE RIVALRY WAS CONFIDENTIAL
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MORE FUNDAMENTAL AND IMPORTANT THAN THE COLLUSION. COLLUSION COULD ONLY BE TEMPORARY AND ILLUSORY BECAUSE THE USSR WAS REALLY WORKING FOR WORLD DOMINATION. AS FOR EUROPE, IT WAS THE AREA OF THE WORLD IN WHICH THE US/USSR RIVALRY AND COLLUSION WERE ACCENTUATED, BECAUSE CONTROL OVER WESTERN EUROPE WAS THE MAJOR SOVIET TARGET AT THIS TIME.

4. DUZER WAS STRUCK BY CHOU'S REFERENCE TO THE WEST AS CONSCIOUSLY TRYING TO PUSH THE USSR TO MOVE

TOWARD THE EAST, CHINA. THE USUAL LINE WAS THAT THE USSR WAS LEADING THE WESTERN POWERS ASTRAY BY ITS "COLLUSION" SO THAT IT WOULD BE ABLE TO TURN ITS ATTENTION EAST, BUT IN THE NEW FORMULATION CHOU SEEMED TO BE REFERRING TO OSTPOLITIK AND CSCE AS WESTERN POLICIES WHICH MIGHT BE DESIGNED TO ENCOURAGE THE USSR TO MOVE EAST. THIS WAS A NEW NOTE IN THE PRC LINE, WHICH DUZER HOPED CHOU WOULD CLARIFY DURING THEIR TRIP TO PEKING. THE CHOU WARNING TO THE WEST THEREFORE WAS COMPOSED OF TWO PARTS: WARNING THE WEST (FOR ITS OWN BENEFIT) AGAINST BEING TAKEN IN BY THE USSR AND WARNING THE WEST (A THREAT FOR CHINA'S BENEFIT) NOT TO DO KNOWINGLY THINGS WHICH SERVED SOVIET INTERESTS AGAINST CHINA.

5. DUZER THOUGHT THAT THE SOMEWHAT EXAGGERATED ANTI-SOVIET LINE TAKEN BY CHOU WAS PERHAPS DESIGNED MORE TO PROVIDE A RATIONALE FOR HIS POLICIES OF DETENTE WITH THE US AND JAPAN THAN TO HIGHLIGHT THE REAL CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET INTENTIONS. ONLY IF THE SOVIET DANGER WERE SO HEIGHTENED WOULD IT SEEM REASONABLE (TO THE CHINESE) FOR CHOU TO HAVE MADE THE DECISIVE SHIFT VIS-A-VIS THE ARCH-IMPERIALIST POWER. DUZER THOUGHT THAT THE ACCUSATIONS THAT LIN PIAO HAD CONNIVED WITH THE SOVIETS WAS PURE INVENTION, BUT IT SHOWED THE IMPORTANCE OF TIEING TOGETHER CHOU'S INTERNATIONAL POLICIES AND THE INTERNAL FIGHT AGAINST LIN PIAO. THE RELATIVELY POPULAR ANTI-SOVIET LINE WAS NEEDED TO SMEAR LIN PIAO BECAUSE SOME OF HIS FORMER COLLAGUES AND SUPPORTERS WERE STILL A FORCE TO BE
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RECKONED WITH. IN ADDITION TO THE USUAL IDEOLOGICAL POINTS IN THIS ESCALATION OF THE ANTI-SOVIET INVECTIVE, THERE WERE ALSO SOME DIRECT PROVOCATIONS SUCH AS CHOU'S CALL FOR THE USSR TO WITHDRAW TROOPS FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND MONGOLIA AND TO RETURN THE KURILES TO JAPAN. IT WAS A SIGNIFICANT SHIFT FOR THE PRC TO TAKE SIDES WITH THE FORMER ENEMY, JAPAN, AGAINST THE FORMER OPPONENT OF "FASCISM".

6. SINCE DUZER'S VIEWS OF THE TENTH PARTY CONGRESS WERE ADDED TO POMPIDOU'S BRIEFING PAPERS FOR THE CHINA VISIT, THEY MAY INFLUENCE THE FRENCH PARTY'S VIEW OF THE CHINA SCENE.

GDS
STONE

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED USLO PEKING.

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NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PFOR
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 13 SEP 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: boyleja
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973PARIS24147
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: RR
Errors: N/A
Film Number: n/a
From: PARIS
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19730935/aaaaazsv.tel
Line Count: 169
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION EA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: boyleja
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 31 JUL 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <31-Jul-2001 by kellew0>; APPROVED <14-Aug-2001 by boyleja>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: QUAI VIEWS OF PRC TENTH PARTY CONGRESS
TAGS: FR, CH, UR
To: SECSTATE WASHDC MOSCOW CONGEN HONG KONG BONN LONDON NATO
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005